A political post, for once…
My article for Security Watch on the failed Azerbaijan-Armenia peace talks in France appears
hereThe Nargorno-Karabakh war (1992-94) was a vicious, brutal affair, if you can somehow prioritize the violence and brutality of wars – some being not so bad as wars go, others because of the methods used or the savagery aroused seeming to touch something visceral in us that we would rather not confront, at least in peacetime.
That’s the insidious danger of war, I think: the feelings of group-identity and tribal affiliation are an ingrained part of being human, and even if we have lived alongside another tribe for eons, we so often welcome the opportunity of shedding the garments of civilization for the delirious intoxication of killing. What triggers this lust for violence is a deeply rooted genetic marker - as deeply rooted as our need for cooperation, one should hasten to add.
The state is not the primary driving force here, but one that structures and rationalizes ethnic or tribal identity: the State as Leviathan, the State as the grand superstructure that brings “meaning” to our brutality as well as our collective notions of truth and virtue and justice.
As Randall Jarrell said in his most famous poem:
From my mother's sleep I fell into the State,
And I hunched in its belly till my wet fur froze.
Six miles from earth, loosed from its dream of life,
I woke to black flak and the nightmare fighters.
When I died they washed me out of the turret with a hose.
And Wilfred Gibson in his poem "Back":
They ask me where I've been,
And what I've done and seen.
But what can I reply
Who know it wasn't I,
But someone just like me,
Who went across the sea
And with my head and hands
Killed men in foreign lands...
Though I must bear the blame,
Because he bore my name.
I’d very much like to know if the Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) war produced a poetic tradition in either country. Azerbaijan is a society that, like many Muslim countries, honors its poets. I’ll have to find out and post what I discover in the near future. I’d like to think that the poetry is as reflective and compassionate as that found in Britain or Germany or America after the two world wars. But I’m going to guess that it’s not.
The lingering, open wound from the NK war is the one topic that binds Azeris, at least binding them in a kind of mournful retribution pact – a retribution that will almost certainly not come in the next decade, if ever. Both countries are mired in history and unlike Saul Bellow’s “woman of bittah-ness,” there is no willingness to take the blow without ultimate revenge.
The latest news here on the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process is that it is dead. At least, that seems to be what President Aliyev is saying. Actually, he said yesterday that the talks with Armenia are at “a dead end.” The phrase “dead end” when applied to the talks (or applied to anything else, for that matter) has a finality about it: dead end = dead. “Dead end” doesn’t mean “in a state of suspended animation.” It means “no way out,” “dead,” i.e. not living, devoid of life, moribund, expired…

Dead.
As I told a source in the Azerbaijani government recently, I don’t pretend to know what the true nature of the government’s strategy is, but I think there are very few possibilities: 1) they are stalling for time, 2) their strategy has changed drastically, or 3) their strategy was mis-read all along.
Possibility 1 suggests that the president believes that the re-acquisition of NK is impossible and that he will grudgingly accept a plebiscite somewhere down the road. This has been the judgment of the international community for some time, and I am beginning to think that this was a fundamentally flawed interpretation.
Thus, possibility 3 means that the “Prague Process” – at least as understood by the Azerbaijanis – may simply have been a way to wrest control from Armenia of the seven occupied regions surrounding NK in the short term while making zero commitments regarding the future status of NK proper.
So the Azerbaijani understanding was: Prague Process = acquisition of 7 regions + major gains now, no agreement to future plebiscite.
The Armenian understanding was the reverse: Prague Process = 5 of 7 regions given back to Azerbaijan + status quo for NK now, with commitment to plebiscite.
If both of the above are true, then for at least a year and a half, certain think tanks as well as the OSCE Minsk Group may have been hearing what they wanted to hear. So when the two presidents agreed to meet at Rambouillet on 10 February, there was a sense of misplaced optimism fueled by the OSCE, which then quickly crashed in flames at the negotiating table.
And here in Baku, a silly story about the Armenian president getting orders from Moscow in the men’s room explains everything.
# 2 above is also plausible, especially given recent discussions in Baku that “maybe we ought to at least talk about the implications of this referendum idea.” But if that was a serious option, it is either now completely off the table or it is being re-packaged for presentation at a later date.
The next few months are critical. It should be obvious by the autumn, let’s say, whether the plebiscite really is dead (along with the Prague Process) or whether President Aliyev intends to revive it. If so, look for a softening in the anti-Armenian rhetoric and an emphasis on “dialogue.”
You can’t make peace easily with a people you’ve been demonizing for over 14 years. If indeed you have already come to terms with the notion that you’re never going to get NK back, then perhaps the best you can do is take what you can get.
One cannot spend any time in Baku without being overwhelmed by the degree to which the Armenian people have become “the other” – an overused expression in political and social analysis, perhaps, but in this case apropos. The hatred for Armenia is deeply ingrained in Azeris, who learn from an early age about Armenia’s treachery, Armenia’s “genocide” against the town of Khojaly (where a massacre did take place), Armenia’s “invented” genocide at the hands of Turkey and its Black Sea to Caspian grand strategy. You can’t turn around one day and suddenly announce to your people that you have reached a painful compromise with Armenia – unless you take years to prepare them for such a day.
The situation is comparatively easy for Armenians, since they won the war. They don’t need to paint the Azeris as “evil” or as the head of the Karabakh Liberation Organization put it to me last week while referring to Armenia, “one of the worst nations of the world.” This man, Akif Nagi, also has deep contempt for the Russians – a common view here, at least with respect to NK.
What about the Russians? This brings us to possibility #4.
Russia, like any great power, expects something in return for being the “guarantor” (as they are fond of saying) of any future peace settlement.
And some people here suggest that the key to any settlement lies with Russia. Since the only “key” that is acceptable to Azerbaijan must include an eventual return of NK that includes some kind of sovereignty, then the Russians will have to lean hard on their regional ally and client state Armenia. Its president, Robert Kocharian, won’t like that one bit, so he will have to be persuaded. Or cajoled, or assured, or threatened.
Why would Russia do such a thing? Because they will get something in return from Azerbaijan – seen as America’s ally if not its client state. Russia will enjoy renewed power and prestige, perhaps economic concessions from Azerbaijan and most unsettling of all for the US, deeper military ties that will weaken America’s relationship with Azerbaijan as well as its overall presence on Russia’s southern flank. And then America’s only staunch ally in the Caucasus will be Georgia: weak, faltering, torn by at least two of its own separatist movements, both of which are supported by…Russia.
That’s a huge payoff for the Russians as well as for Azerbaijan. President Aliyev will be hailed as a national savior. Vladimir Putin, Russia’s latest Tsar, will be seen as a great statesman. And the US will be reduced to the role of an onlooker.
I’m not saying all this will happen. But it’s an intriguing possibility. We shall see…